Wednesday, November 09, 2005
"Ich mag Müll": Oscar the Grouch and Slimy as a Thinly-Veiled Allegory For The
Libertarian and the Determinist Debating the Argument From Moral Responsibility
One morning Slimy awoke with an appetite insatiable. Encountering a cherished rotten apple at the bottom of Oscar the Grouch's refuse (Müll) bin, Slimy deliberated between two conflicting desires: Ought I eat this apple? he inquired of his slimy self, or should I ignore it in order that I might no longer have this hungry feeling? After weighing the reasons for which either course of action might be advantageous or disadvantageous, Slimy for various internal reasons opted to eat the apple entire. He felt not one ounce of guilt for fulfilling this volition, until Oscar the Grouch awoke much later and, finding his favorite apple consumed and irretrievable, duly rebuked Slimy: 'How could you take what was a beautiful thing and destroy it according to your selfish desires? You should feel ashamed, and I feel an obligation to in some manner punish you for this vile deed.'
Indeed, then, did Slimy regret his course of action... but only for a moment, for he then reflected, How could I have done otherwise? My actions are always the products of the laws of nature and of antecedent states of affairs. He then gave Oscar a long look which expressed the following: The infinite chain of events governing my existence determined that I eat that apple. You assume I was free to choose between eating that apple and the many alternatives available, but this feeling of yours is pure, illusory hokum. 'But you do have a self-evident feeling of responsibility for what you just did!' countered Oscar, 'You must agree that you freely chose to eat that apple, for it is more certain than your belief in universal causality.'
Nevertheless, Slimy ignored Oscar's argument. His line of reasoning began with the acknowledgement of deliberation merely as a process consisting, as according to Ledger Wood, with the recognition of two or more incompatible courses of action, about which one might weigh considerations for and against engaging in any of those courses. Finally, a choice would be made, but the feeling of control over the action would be a "subjective illusion". Adolf Greenbaum adds that this action is resultant from a prevailing motive, which might have been different under the same exact circumstances, and that would have produced a different action. The thoughts producing deliberation are purely neural, and thus are not evidential for indeterminacy.
In the event Oscar might claim Slimy possessed moral responsibility from the fact that he chose his action from his own beliefs and desires, Slimy prepared the following argument: Desire is based upon certain beliefs. My action was the result of my beliefs and desires with regards to eating the apple, but I did not freely choose to have those beliefs. My beliefs and desires are the result of my environment (presently, Oscar’s trash can) in conjunction with my own innate dispositions. Therefore, my action was not freely chosen, for I did not control the causal processes forming my beliefs and desires. Oscar stubbornly resisted this claim, choosing to re-posit his position that Slimy had, in fact, chosen between conflicting beliefs and desires. But Slimy shook his wormy head. My beliefs, dear Oscar, are truth-directed events. They stem from the ways in which the world is represented, as I perceive them. Since I cannot determine the truth of something for myself, my beliefs about that truth are in themselves illusions. These things, called “desires”, I do not choose- they merely formulate my choices.
Oscar at this point exclaimed exasperatedly, 'Your argument is too simplistic and ignores the intangibles! You must admit that you are the agent effecting change, despite no essential change to your self.' Oscar had read and agreed with an excerpt of ideas from Richard Taylor, who claims that humans are different from material objects- they are not the collections of things and events, but rather self-motivated beings. Taylor calls his own concept of causation 'extraordinary', for it holds that the agent (who is a substance) of an action may nevertheless be its cause, without something else causing him. He could not be considered the antecedent. Therefore, deliberation is both possible and rational for the agent of action, when the self is considered separate from one's thoughts, volitions, and choices. Thus, Oscar concluded for Slimy, 'Sometimes, I create things ex nihilo.' Slimy looked at Oscar through his trashy din, wondering yet how Oscar might account for the self, and also how actions could possibly arise from anything besides the laws of nature. But Oscar, anticipating these doubts, refuted, 'I am more certain of my self than of anything else, and shall evermore assert that I am the cause of my actions, despite my self being inexplicable.'
Herein ambled Cookie Monster, gobbling a handful of cookies. Oscar shouted with much belligerence, 'Why don’t you stop eating cookies? You could lose weight if you did otherwise.' Cookie Monster, unperturbed, replied, ‘Me content with who me is.’ To this profundity he added, 'All Oscar’s and Slimy’s philosophical ideas are "altars to unknown gods". To Cookie Monster, is one thing certain: cookie.' To Slimy he gave an approving pat, and Oscar, still ranting, Cookie Monster as usual ignored, for he cared most for eating cookies, not contemplating whether he ought be praised or punished for so doing.
[Lauree Frances Keith concluded this diatribe at 7:27 AM]